Structuralism, Individualism & The First World War

Nine European Sovereigns at Windsor for the funeral of King Edward VII in May of 1910, four years before the war began. Standing, from left to right: King Haakon VII of Norway, Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King Manuel II of Portugal, Kaiser Wilhelm II of the German Empire, King George I of Greece and King Albert I of Belgium. Seated, from left to right: King Alfonso XIII of Spain, King-Emperor George V of the United Kingdom and King Frederick VIII of Denmark.

Structuralism, Individualism & The First World War

 Two divergent and conflicting theoretical perspectives have come to dominate center stage in international politics. The fist of these being the structuralist perspective, the second being the individualist perspective. My first task shall be to present briefly the major assumptions of both theoretical perspectives; first the structuralist, and then the individualist, perspective will be presented. Taking World War One as my specific case I shall argue that four factors make the structuralist perspective the more useful in explaining the outbreak of that war; namely, colonialism, nationalism, monarchic imperialism on the continent, and the schedules of military mobilization.

There are three relevant conceptual constructs underlying the basic assumptions of the realist account of state behavior (Hughes 1990:111). First, human nature makes the struggle for power a constant in international relations. Second, power can be countered effectively only with counterpower. Third, international peace and stability are maintained via the equilibrium of power and counterpower whereby states restrain each other from undue aggression. Realism also assumes that the nation state is both the basic unit of analysis and the highest authority in a world state system lacking centralized control (Hughes 1990: 52). In contrast an individualist perspective focuses on the conscious decisions and personalities of the leaders of the combatant nations when examining the outbreak of war (Stoessinger 1990:209).

Kaiser Wilhelm II of the German Empire

In the case of World War One Kaiser Wilhelm II has been vilified by many for precipitating the war with unduly aggressive brinksmanship (as evidenced by the Moroccan crises) and paranoid delusions of German encirclement by the other great European powers (Stoessinger 1990: 12-14). Ironically the U. S., a great power a continent away, was in fact going to be the ultimate undoing of the German Empire. According to an individualist account abdication of personal responsibility for decision making and overall mediocrity were displayed on the part of all the leaders of the great European powers at the outset of the First World War (Stoessinger 1990: 21-24). The leaders in question failed on many accounts. For instance, diabolical images of the enemy were prevalent in the minds of said leaders. Furthermore, there was in evidence complete lack of empathy on the part of decision makers; in the jargon of intelligence analysts there was a failure of “mirror imaging” by policy makers to coopt the process of system wide structural failure.

My argument that the structuralist perspective is the more useful in explaining the outbreak of World War One is partially one of context; i. e. I do not think that structuralist accounts are in general more useful in explaining any war. Still realpolitik alliance building and its attendant secret diplomacy, nationalism, mobilization, colonialism abroad and monarchical autocracy on the continent were systemically cancerous in a way that outweighed the merely personal shortcoming of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Czar Nicholas II in precipitating the Great War.

Two cousins ~ Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia

Of particular relevance to the issue of root causes of the outbreak of World War One is the alliance structure that had developed in Europe during the nineteenth century. Specifically, in the jockeying to maintain systemic political-military equilibrium two fairly rigid alliance structures had arrayed themselves against one another (Hughes 1990:112). The alliances in question were the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy on the one hand, Britain, France and Russia on the other; we have here almost exactly the opposing camps that eventually squared off in Nineteen fourteen. Also, Belgium with its strategic location between the three great powers of Britain, France and Germany, an issue central to Britain’s entry into the war, was declared perpetually neutral by treaty in 1839 (Hughes 1990:111).

Kaiser Wilhelm II and British Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill

 Another important structural concept in the explanation of the outbreak of the First World War is that of nationalism (Hughes 1990:197). At the time of the outbreak of World War One many European ethnic groups seeking national self determination and sovereignty were living under the occupation of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. The assassination of the Austro-Hungarian archduke Francis Ferdinand by Serbian nationalist Gavrillo Princip, the event most often cited as the spark that made the Balkan “tinderbox of Europe” explode, occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a region of Serbia that had recently been annexed by Austria-Hungary. Interestingly the structural problem of nationalism in the Balkans is still evident in the newspapers of today. Needless to say subjugation of nationalities by the European monarchies was by no means limited to the continent (Wittkopf 1989: 97-99). Competition for foreign markets at that time took on a decidedly more mercantilist character than it presently does, which in turn complicated the balance of power equation for the kings and secret diplomats who played chess with human lives.

In Nineteen fourteen mobilization was a dreaded word almost synonymous with declaration of war (Holsti 1992: 242-243). The decision making process regarding negotiations to cease hostile actions at the outset of the war was hampered by the relentless schedules of mobilization. In fact, even on the field of battle at Tannenberg, one of the wars initial battles, Russian and German corps commanders found military decision making hampered by the structure of mobilization imposed from on high by the general staffs(Liddel Hart 1930: 104-105).

Furthermore, two of the principle combatants, the German and Russian Empires, could quite arguably be characterized as reactionary monarchies. In light of the track record democracies have of not going to war with one another one sees the converse in the relations of the demonstrably expansionist empires of Germany and Russia prior to Nineteen fourteen (Hughes 1990: 188).

In his conclusion to Why Nations Go to War John G. Stoessinger uses sickness as a metaphor for the human condition of war (Stoessinger 1990: 205-206). I shall employ Mr. Stoessinger’s metaphor in a counter argument against his individualist conclusion regarding the outbreak of World War One. I agree that war is a disease, but it is my contention that the disease is rooted in structural degradation rather than the decisions leaders make of their own “free will”. When suffering from a physical disease the doctor diagnoses the physical causes, which like structures human beings do not control. The seeming irrationality of the kings and diplomats who played chess with human beings is the symptom rather than the cause of the systemic failure that precipitated World War One. With the structural forces that were gathering on the horizon at the turn of the century I do not see how the outcome could have been other than the great catastrophe that took fifteen million lives. In seeking to place the blame on a few elites who after all are only human beings the individualist account fails to recognize a dependence of which we are not conscious (Tolstoy).

Gen. John "Black Jack" Pershing visits Arlington National Cemetery in 1925.