Structuralism, Individualism & The First World War
Two
divergent and conflicting theoretical perspectives have come to
dominate center stage in international politics. The fist of these
being the structuralist perspective, the second being the
individualist perspective. My first task shall be to present briefly
the major assumptions of both theoretical perspectives; first the
structuralist, and then the individualist, perspective will be
presented. Taking World War One as my specific case I shall argue
that four factors make the structuralist perspective the more useful
in explaining the outbreak of that war; namely, colonialism,
nationalism, monarchic imperialism on the continent, and the
schedules of military mobilization.
There are
three relevant conceptual constructs underlying the basic assumptions
of the realist account of state behavior (Hughes 1990:111). First,
human nature makes the struggle for power a constant in international
relations. Second, power can be countered effectively only with
counterpower. Third, international peace and stability are
maintained via the equilibrium of power and counterpower whereby
states restrain each other from undue aggression. Realism also
assumes that the nation state is both the basic unit of analysis and
the highest authority in a world state system lacking centralized
control (Hughes 1990: 52). In contrast an individualist perspective
focuses on the conscious decisions and personalities of the leaders
of the combatant nations when examining the outbreak of
war (Stoessinger 1990:209).
Kaiser Wilhelm II of the German Empire |
In the case
of World War One Kaiser Wilhelm II has been vilified by many for
precipitating the war with unduly aggressive brinksmanship (as
evidenced by the Moroccan crises) and paranoid delusions of German
encirclement by the other great European powers (Stoessinger 1990:
12-14). Ironically the U. S., a great power a continent away, was
in fact going to be the ultimate undoing of the German Empire.
According to an individualist account abdication of personal
responsibility for decision making and overall mediocrity were
displayed on the part of all the leaders of the great European powers
at the outset of the First World War (Stoessinger 1990: 21-24). The
leaders in question failed on many accounts. For instance,
diabolical images of the enemy were prevalent in the minds of said
leaders. Furthermore, there was in evidence complete lack of empathy
on the part of decision makers; in the jargon of intelligence
analysts there was a failure of “mirror imaging” by policy makers
to coopt the process of system wide structural failure.
My argument
that the structuralist perspective is the more useful in explaining
the outbreak of World War One is partially one of context; i. e. I do
not think that structuralist accounts are in general more useful in
explaining any war. Still realpolitik alliance building and its
attendant secret diplomacy, nationalism, mobilization, colonialism
abroad and monarchical autocracy on the continent were systemically
cancerous in a way that outweighed the merely personal shortcoming of
Kaiser Wilhelm II and Czar Nicholas II in precipitating the Great
War.
Two cousins ~ Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia |
Of
particular relevance to the issue of root causes of the outbreak of
World War One is the alliance structure that had developed in Europe
during the nineteenth century. Specifically, in the jockeying to
maintain systemic political-military equilibrium two fairly rigid
alliance structures had arrayed themselves against one another (Hughes
1990:112). The alliances in question were the Triple Alliance and
the Triple Entente consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy
on the one hand, Britain, France and Russia on the other; we have
here almost exactly the opposing camps that eventually squared off in
Nineteen fourteen. Also, Belgium with its strategic location between
the three great powers of Britain, France and Germany, an issue
central to Britain’s entry into the war, was declared perpetually
neutral by treaty in 1839 (Hughes 1990:111).
Kaiser Wilhelm II and British Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill |
Another
important structural concept in the explanation of the outbreak of
the First World War is that of nationalism (Hughes 1990:197). At the
time of the outbreak of World War One many European ethnic groups
seeking national self determination and sovereignty were living under
the occupation of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires.
The assassination of the Austro-Hungarian archduke Francis Ferdinand
by Serbian nationalist Gavrillo Princip, the event most often cited
as the spark that made the Balkan “tinderbox of Europe” explode,
occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a region of Serbia that had recently
been annexed by Austria-Hungary. Interestingly the structural
problem of nationalism in the Balkans is still evident in the
newspapers of today. Needless to say subjugation of nationalities by
the European monarchies was by no means limited to the
continent (Wittkopf 1989: 97-99). Competition for foreign markets at
that time took on a decidedly more mercantilist character than it
presently does, which in turn complicated the balance of power
equation for the kings and secret diplomats who played chess with
human lives.
In
Nineteen fourteen mobilization was a dreaded word almost synonymous
with declaration of war (Holsti 1992: 242-243). The decision making
process regarding negotiations to cease hostile actions at the outset
of the war was hampered by the relentless schedules of mobilization.
In fact, even on the field of battle at Tannenberg, one of the wars
initial battles, Russian and German corps commanders found military
decision making hampered by the structure of mobilization imposed
from on high by the general staffs(Liddel Hart 1930: 104-105).
Furthermore,
two of the principle combatants, the German and Russian Empires,
could quite arguably be characterized as reactionary monarchies. In
light of the track record democracies have of not going to war with
one another one sees the converse in the relations of the
demonstrably expansionist empires of Germany and Russia prior to
Nineteen fourteen (Hughes 1990: 188).
In his
conclusion to Why Nations Go to War John G. Stoessinger uses sickness
as a metaphor for the human condition of war (Stoessinger 1990:
205-206). I shall employ Mr. Stoessinger’s metaphor in a counter
argument against his individualist conclusion regarding the outbreak
of World War One. I agree that war is a disease, but it is my
contention that the disease is rooted in structural degradation
rather than the decisions leaders make of their own “free will”.
When suffering from a physical disease the doctor diagnoses the
physical causes, which like structures human beings do not control.
The seeming irrationality of the kings and diplomats who played chess
with human beings is the symptom rather than the cause of the
systemic failure that precipitated World War One. With the
structural forces that were gathering on the horizon at the turn of
the century I do not see how the outcome could have been other than
the great catastrophe that took fifteen million lives. In seeking to
place the blame on a few elites who after all are only human beings
the individualist account fails to recognize a dependence of which we
are not conscious (Tolstoy).
Gen. John "Black Jack" Pershing visits Arlington National Cemetery in 1925. |